Daniel Overbeck
Mailing address:
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
National University of Singapore
469C Bukit Timah Road
Singapore 259772
E-mail:
daniel.overbeck "at" nus.edu.sg
Links:
NUS Website
Twitter
Welcome!
I am an Assistant Professor of Economics (tenure-track) at the National University of Singapore (Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy). I received my PhD from the University of Mannheim in June 2025.
My main research interests are in Public Economics and Development Economics.
Curriculum Vitae
Publications:
Place-based policies, structural change and female labor: Evidence from India's Special Economic Zones
(with Johannes Gallé , Nadine Riedel and Tobias Seidel)
Journal of Public Economics, 2024
This paper quantifies the local economic impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that were established in India between 2005-2013. Based on a novel data set that combines census data on the universe of Indian firms with georeferenced data on SEZs, we find that SEZs increased manufacturing and service employment with positive spillover effects up to 10km. This employment gain was paralleled by a decline in local agricultural employment, in particular of women, suggesting that the policy contributed to structural change. We find no evidence for heterogeneous effects between privately and publicly run SEZs or zones with different industry denominations.
[Open Access JPubE] [STEG/CEPR Working Paper] [Video Interview with faculti.net] [VoxDev Blog]
Working Papers:
Bargaining Over Taxes
(with Eliya Lungu)
Job Market Paper
IGC grant (GBP 10,000)
This paper shows that bargaining over tax payments is an important feature of tax compliance and enforcement in lower income countries. Analyzing the universe of administrative tax filings from Zambia, we document sharp bunching in (i) dominated regions above tax schedule discontinuities, inconsistent with standard models of tax compliance and (ii) at round number tax payments, implying that certain payments are being targeted. Additional evidence from our own survey suggests that discussing tax payments with tax officials before filing taxes is widespread, consistent with tax payments being the outcomes of bargaining. Such bargaining over taxes is consistent with fact (ii), as bargaining outcomes are often round and salient numbers, and with fact (i), because tax schedule discontinuities restrict the set of feasible bargaining outcomes. Finally, we generalize the conventional Allingham & Sandmo (1972) model to allow for bargaining as a mode of tax compliance. We show that bargaining leads to Pareto-improvements for both taxpayers and the state as long as state capacity is sufficiently low.
[Download] [CESifo Working Paper] [IGC Blog] [Policy Brief]
Carbon taxation and firm behavior in emerging economies: Evidence from South Africa
(with Johannes Gallé, Rodrigo Oliveira, Nadine Riedel and Edson Severnini)
UNU-WIDER grant (USD 10,000)
This paper provides the first comprehensive evidence on how firms in emerging economies respond to carbon taxation. Using detailed administrative data, we study the announcement and implementation of South Africa’s 2019 carbon tax—a potential trailblazer for other developing countries with limited state capacity amid the global expansion of carbon pricing. Contrary to concerns that carbon taxes might hinder growth or employment, we find no negative effects on firm performance or jobs. Firms facing higher effective tax rates increased activity following the tax’s announcement, four years before implementation, likely reflecting the resolution of regulatory uncertainty and efforts to mitigate stranded asset costs. While we find no measurable reduction in emissions — likely due to this anticipatory behavior—our results suggest that carbon taxation can be implemented without harming economic outcomes, even in the short term and in low- and middle-income settings.
Taxing FDI in a developing economy: the case of informality
This paper introduces a new model which captures the eff ect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on a developing economy with an informal sector. The informal sector evolves endogenously as economic agents choose between working and setting up a firm and whether to do so formally or informally. FDI induces a uniform increase in labor costs but heterogenous productivity increases for domestic formal firms. Accordingly, some of these fi rms may opt for informality with increased FDI. This reduction in the domestic tax base may off set any revenue gains from additional FDI. It is shown that the revenue-neutral tax rate on FDI is decreasing in the government’s efficiency in screening tax avoidance, as more efficient governments are able to attenuate the increase in informality. The empirical analysis supports the key conclusions of the model.
Work in Progress:
IGC grant (GBP 2,000)
News and upcoming talks:
I recently presented at the following events: